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Social Justice in a Market Order: Graduate Employment and Social Mobility in the UK 
 
 
Abstract: Framed within a Gramscian analytical perspective, this 
article contrasts the 'transparent neoliberalism' of one of its leading 
organic intellectuals, Friederich Hayek, with one of the key 
discourses of 'euphemized neoliberalism' in the UK: higher 
education's promise of social justice through social mobility. The 
article discusses the disjunctions between ideology and discourse but 
also between discourse and the reality of class-based unequal 
graduate employment outcomes in the UK. I then consider some 
recent policy proposals to redress such inequalities and scrutinise 
these in the light of Hayek's views on social justice within a market 
economy. In the final section, I return to Gramsci to re-evaluate the 
continuing relevance of the concept of organic intellectuals in the 
light of debates around the shifting position of intellectuals within 
contemporary society. 
 
Introduction 
This article discusses the social justice concerns, as expressed in recent policy documents, 
surrounding social class-related unequal graduate employment outcomes in the UK, and their 
consequent implications for social mobility. My purpose in undertaking this discussion is to 
illustrate, through a Gramscian analytical focus, the inherent tensions between three key 
elements of neoliberal hegemony within the United Kingdom: ideology, discourse, and lived 
realities. The article is structured into five sections. In the first, I sketch the outlines of 
neoliberalism as a hegemonic project. In the second, I apply Phelan’s (2007) concept of 
‘transparent neoliberalism’ to examine the ideology of Friederich Hayek who unapologetically 
saw the free market as an essentially amoral social order. In the third section, I contrast the 
harder-edged transparent neoliberalism of Hayek’s ideology with what Phelan (2007) terms 
‘euphemized neoliberalism’. This may be best understood as form of discursive neoliberal 
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political identity which purposely seeks to distance itself from the starker ideology of Hayek and 
fellow ideologues for electorally strategic purposes. As I discuss, higher education, with its 
promise of graduate social mobility, is a key site for the articulation of euphemized neoliberal 
discourses. I argue that, although such discourses are rhetorically distinct from Hayekian 
ideology, they are no less neoliberal and so the study of neoliberalism and social justice requires 
attention to both faces of neoliberalism. Within that section, I also examine the problems that 
attend higher education’s social mobility promise and recent policy interventions to ameliorate 
class-based inequalities in graduate employment outcomes in the UK. In the fourth section, I 
hold these discourses and interventionist measures up to the light of Hayek’s views on social 
justice. The final section revisits the concept of organic intellectuals in the light of Bauman's 
(1988) critique of its continuing utility. 
The contribution of this article to the existing literature around neoliberalism lies in three key 
areas. It is a well observed fact that there is frequently a distance between the transparent and 
euphemized faces of neoliberalism in the UK, that is, between its ideological underpinnings and 
its public discourses and practices (Desai, 1994; Mirowski, 2013; Peck, 2013). Similarly, there is 
a wealth of literature which has highlighted the dissonances between the euphemized 
neoliberalism which promises social mobility through higher education and the lived realities of 
many graduates, particularly those from working-class backgrounds (Bathmaker, Ingram & 
Waller, 2013; Brown, 2013; Burke, 2016; Keep and Mayhew, 2016). The first contribution of 
this article, therefore, is to add to both bodies of literature by taking the unusual approach of 
spanning and relating these three pivotal aspects of neoliberalism—ideology, discourses and 
lived realities. Secondly, it will do so by applying a close reading of Hayek's key texts to the 
particular problematic of this study. While critical attention has been devoted to Hayek’s general 
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position on social justice (Feser, 1997; Lister 2013; Lukes 1997), there is a paucity of literature 
which has sought to relate Hayek’s theories to the question of class-based unequal graduate 
employment outcomes.  
This is important because the choice of Hayek is particularly apposite to this study. I share with 
other scholars (Gamble, 1996; Griffiths, 2014) the view that Hayek's ideology was complex, 
being dogmatic but also offering a greater subtlety and nuance than his public image presents. 
Unlike many of his fellow free-market proselytisers, his writings ranged beyond economics to 
philosophy and epistemology.  Thus, while Hayek's ultimate conclusions in relation to social 
justice certainly represent transparent neoliberalism, his ideas on spontaneous orders, the limits 
of knowledge and market morality are sophisticated and, unwittingly, offer resources for a 
critique of the practices of euphemized neoliberalism. Indeed, as I discuss, it is ironic that one of 
neoliberalism’s chief Gramscian organic intellectuals should have maintained a perspicacious, if 
unpitying, view of the limits of social justice via social mobility within a market order that 
accords with the realities that many young people face.  
 
The Hegemony of Neoliberalism 
There are many possible definitions of the promiscuously applied concept of neoliberalism 
(Peck, 2013 p.133). However, one central aspect identified by Hall (2016, p.14), and which 
forms the operative basis for this article's discussions, is that of the 'free, possessive individual': a 
political-economic model which privileges the 'natural' running of the free market over the 
'oppression' of state intervention  in the name of both individual freedom and economic 
efficiency. While this is a very partial definition, the lineaments of this model may be found in 
every UK government since the election of the first Thatcher administration in 1979. However, 
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there were important differences in the U.K. between the 'New Right' neoliberalism of the 
Thatcher and Major administrations, the 'Third Way' version pursued by their New Labour 
successor and the versions followed by the Coalition government and the present Conservative 
administration. While the Thatcher governments successfully combined strident free market 
rhetoric and relative indifference to inequalities with an older conservative nationalistic 
discourse, Blair's New Labour attempted to perform a 'double shuffle' in combining a form of 
'managerial marketisation' of public services with a socially democratic focus upon the 
amelioration of social inequalities (Hall, 2016). In contrast, austerity-driven welfare cuts 
characterised both the Coalition government of 2010-15 and the present Conservative 
administration. These cuts, when added to the avowed desire of many in the present 
Conservative administration to fundamentally re-shape the UK’s public-private GDP balance, 
have arguably led to a level of market-led economic liberalism not experienced since the 1930s 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2013). That we can apply the term neoliberal to all these different governments 
reflects the plasticity of the concept; this plasticity, in turn, may be understood in terms of a 
Gramscian hegemonic formation with both ideological and discursive facets. 
If ideology is to be understood, fundamentally, as the attempt to win consent to a worldview 
through the power of ideas (Desai, 1994) then neoliberalism clearly has an ideological basis. 
Ideological shifts emerge as products of particular historical conjunctures—that is, when 
structural tensions within the hegemonic bloc--the system of alliances sustaining dominant class 
power--are no longer sustainable, thus creating terrain for oppositional forces (Gramsci, 1988, 
p.201). In the case of the UK, this process was played out in the collapse of the previously 
hegemonic consensus around Keynesian economics and the welfare state during the economic 
turbulence of the 1970s and its replacement with a market-led governance after 1979. However, 
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this was not a spontaneous process; it required the work of organic intellectuals--individuals 
who, during periods of economic and social tensions, rise up from within the new social group or 
class with the purpose of creating a new counter-hegemonic narrative. If successful, the new 
narrative becomes an organic ideology, that is, one that has an apparently natural rather than an 
arbitrary or imposed relationship to a given social structure (Gramsci, 1971, p.376).  
As Gramsci (1971, p.6) recognised, particular kinds of intellectuals will emerge from specific 
historical conditions. In response to what they perceived to be the new hegemony of collectivist 
political and economic practices across Western democracies in the immediate aftermath of 
World War Two, the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) was founded by Hayek in 1947. In his account 
of the MPS, Mirowski (2013) is careful neither to reduce neoliberalism to the MPS nor to ignore 
the tensions between different intellectual strains within it. Nevertheless, he argues convincingly 
that we should view the MPS as a key reference point in any study of neoliberalism (Mirowski, 
2013, p.43). From its outset, the MPS aimed at nothing less than the wholesale re-education of 
society into the virtues of a new political project that was antithetical to both the night-watchman 
state of classical liberalism and the collectivist social welfare state: what we may broadly call 
neoliberalism.  
The MPS is not neoliberalism tout court, and Hayek was one voice within the MPS. However, as 
Mirowski (2013, p.39) argues, it is central to understanding the origins of neoliberalism's present 
hegemony. Furthermore, it is clear that the impact of Hayekian ideology (among that of other 
market ideologues) on actual policy practice was considerable. For example, for Desai (1994, 
p.41), Thatcherism was characterised by the sharply ideological rather than pragmatic nature of 
its governance, a feature which distinguished it from the 'ad hoc, atheoretical empiricism' of 
traditional British intellectual life. However, despite the success of Hayekian ideology on post-
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1979 British governance, there has never been a complete congruence between the tenets of 
neoliberal theory and its public discursive face. Phelan (2007) captures this well in his heuristic 
distinction between euphemized neoliberalism and transparent neoliberalism. The latter concept 
represents the theoretical purism of Hayek and other key neoliberal organic intellectuals, while 
the former is essentially a ‘softer’ articulation of neoliberal values that avoids the sharper and 
more antagonistic discursive stances of transparent neoliberalism (Phelan, 2007, p.33).  
In concrete political terms, the difference between the two faces is exemplified in the shift from 
Thatcherism’s ideologically explicit market-driven agenda to the more euphemized 
neoliberalism of New Labour’s Third Way. Under Blair, market values became rearticulated 
through the more emollient language of social democracy, and nowhere was this more apparent 
than with higher education. New Labour enthusiastically repositioned the sector as the solution 
to market inequalities through widened participation, a discourse which, as Reay (2008, p.644) 
notes wryly, amounted to a direct inversion of Bernstein’s famous dictum that ‘education cannot 
compensate for society’. New Labour’s more socially inclusive language around higher 
education participation points towards the ‘euphemized’ aspect of their governance; the 
‘neoliberalism’ element is reflected in their central ideological focus upon higher education’s 
function in the provision of human capital, as I later discuss. Since New Labour, the Coalition 
government and now the present Conservative administration have emphasised higher 
education’s role in individual social mobility (DBIS, 2011, 2016). Again, as I discuss, this too 
may be considered a euphemized discourse in its capacity to obscure the underlying ideological 
commitment to a free-market order. 
This distance between underpinning ideology and public discourse is a product of what Peck 
(2013) terms the hybrid nature of actually existing neoliberalism: even where it gains dominance 
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it never attains a monopoly but always exists along with other competing cultural and social 
forces. In the case of the UK, one such lingering source of competition is a residual attachment 
to older, more collectivist welfare provisions that pre-date the Thatcherite hegemony (Clarke, 
2007; Desai, 1994). In order to neutralise such rival tendencies, neoliberalism will attempt to 
present a more politically palatable face, although always within the framework of a market 
order (Hall, 2016). And that is in the very nature of a hegemonic formation: it is a dynamic 
process, not a static destination, and dominance has to be continually defended. Consequently, as 
Phelan (2007, p.34) notes, an understanding of euphemized neoliberalism is vital since much of 
neoliberalism’s political success lies in its ability to present itself as a common sense post-
ideological doxa. Or, in Gramscian terms, it exerts the force of an ever-evolving, organic 
ideology deeply sedimented into everyday social practices (Hall, 2016). The overall implication 
of this, as Peck (2013, p.145) argues, is that neoliberalism cannot simply be read off from 
Hayekian texts with any deviation counted as a heterodoxy; rather, a critical theory of 
neoliberalism must attend to the contradictory dynamics between theory and practice, between 
ideology and discourse. This, then, is the analytical framework which I shall apply to the 
problematic of policy concerns around unequal graduate employment outcomes in the UK.  
 
Neoliberalism as Ideology: Hayek's Transparent Neoliberalism 
It is in Hayek's writings, above all, that we see celebrated the 'free possessive individual' (Hall, 
2016). Hayek’s views on the primacy of the free market and, relatedly, on social justice spring 
from the logic of his ontological, epistemological and, ultimately, ethical position in relation to 
society. Hayek’s ontology was a form of methodological individualism: society is an aggregation 
of individuals each of whom acts according to their own individual purposes. What we call 
‘society’ or ‘social ends’ is simply no more than the harmonious but, crucially, not purposely 
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intended alignment of many different ‘individual ends’ (Hayek, 1944, p.63). While this view first 
came to public attention in the classic The Road to Serfdom (1944), it was later elaborated on in 
Hayek’s (1982, p.37) distinction between ‘made’ and ‘spontaneous’ orders. A ‘made’ order is 
that which has been deliberately constructed and which has purposive ends; an organisation such 
as a firm or, at a higher level, the state fitted this category for Hayek (1982). What are commonly 
called ‘society’ and ‘the market’ (as in the economic exchange between individuals) are 
aggregations of all such made orders and of all the individuals functioning within them; they, 
however, cannot meaningfully be said to have an overall purpose as they have their own 
unpredictable organically-driven dynamics: thus, they are highly complex ‘spontaneous orders’. 
The epistemological implication of this ontology is that society and the market become 
unknowably complex and '…such orders as that of the market do not obtrude themselves on our 
senses but have to be traced by our intellect. We cannot see, or otherwise intuitively perceive, 
this order of meaningful actions, but are only able mentally to reconstruct it by tracing the 
relations that exist between the elements' (Hayek, 1982, p.38). The complexity of what we 
loosely call society and the market, and the epistemological difficulties that attend them, mean 
for Hayek that attempts at ‘control’ were both misguided and doomed to failure because it is the 
very fact that the market is an organic, spontaneous order that gives it its flexibility and vitality.  
Consequently, Hayek would admit of governmental intervention in only two areas: the 
application of the law to ensure individuals’ legal equality under conditions of free market 
competition, or what her termed the ‘wealth-creating game’ (Hayek, 1982, p.115) and the 
provision of a ‘given minimum of sustenance’ for everyone (Hayek, 1960, p.226). Hayek was 
scathing about the concept of social justice, particularly where it was understood as redistributive 
justice of the type that characterised the British welfare state in the first three decades or so after 
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the Second World War. This was partly due to his belief, as discussed, that society as a structural 
entity simply did not exist, and that appeals to the ‘social’ constituted a naïve ‘personification’ of 
what he considered to be organically-grown, self-ordering processes (Hayek, 1982, p.62). His 
hostility, however, was also ethical in that he believed that the free market with its ‘impersonal 
forces’ (Hayek, 1944, p.110) offered a much more justifiable defence of the distribution of social 
goods than could the hand of the central planner. Inequalities in income or job prospects could be 
much more readily borne if individuals believed they were the product of the ‘chance’ workings 
of the market rather than of the deliberate design of government. For Hayek, this was a core 
principle: the market meant freedom from coercion by external forces, it most emphatically did 
not mean freedom to attain material equality. 
 
Above all, however, we must recognize that we may be free and yet 
miserable. Liberty does not mean all good things or the absence of all 
evils. It is true that to be free may mean freedom to starve, to make 
costly mistakes, or to run mortal risks. In the sense in which we use 
the term, the penniless vagabond who lives precariously by constant 
improvisation is indeed freer than the conscripted soldier with all his 
security and relative comfort. (Hayek, 1960, p.17) 
 
 
For Phelan (2007, p.34), following his heuristic of transparent vs euphemized neoliberalism, 
Hayek's ideology is form of transparent neoliberalism which is best understood as a chain of 
antagonistic rhetorical equivalences and antitheses: the market equivalenced with freedom as 
against state coercion; the self-directing individual equivalenced with freedom as against the 
ontologically doubtful collective subject; the market as site for the realisation of individual ends 
as opposed to the fallacy of collectivist planning. Neoliberalism is, then, the 'common sense' 
counterpoint to Keynesianism. And, as Desai (1994, p.40) notes, this reflects the nature of 
hegemonic struggle and the role of organic intellectuals such as Hayek within it: responses to 
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conjunctural crises must take the form of creative intellectual interventions that offer a radical 
new alternative to prevailing orthodoxies and this necessarily requires the dismantling rather than 
modification of what went before. However, to be politically viable the publicly discursive face 
of neoliberalism offers a more attenuated version of transparent neoliberalism: euphemized 
neoliberalism. 
 
Euphemized Neoliberalism 
Human capital and the social mobility promise 
Following what are now well rehearsed forms of rhetoric, as an advanced post-Fordist economy, 
the UK’s competitive international edge is seen to reside in its capacity to innovate through 
knowledge creation and application rather than, as at its Fordist stage of economic development, 
through the mass production of standardised goods (Brown, Lauder & Ashton, 2011; Tholen, 
2014). This thesis is, in turn, related to Skill Bias Technology Change theory (SBTC) which 
assumes that technological developments increase the demand for high-level skills over time, 
and both individuals and nations must supply these through investment in education and training-
-their human capital. Consequently, higher education has been recast as the mediator in what 
Lauder, Young, Daniels, Balarin and Lowe (2012, p.6) term a ‘learning = earning’ contract 
between the state and individuals.   
However, social mobility and national economic advancement through upskilling are, in 
principle, distinct policy drives: one may be pursued without reference to the other. Successive 
governments have, though, attempted to yoke them together within the overall discursive 
framework of the learning = earning contract. The balance between them has shifted over time. 
Early New Labour rhetoric attempted to encompass both through such seemingly contradictory 
tropes as the Knowledge Economy and Social Inclusion. By contrast, the steep rise in tuition fees 
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in England since 2010 has seen a policy focus upon legitimating higher education as a human 
capital investment by reference to its social mobility promise. Students are consumers, with 
attendant rights, and universities are publicly accountable within a competitive marketplace for 
the employment outcomes of their graduates (DBIS, 2011, 2016). This performative culture, with 
its emphasis upon outcomes-related accountability as opposed to traditional input-driven models 
of bureaucracy, reflects the effects of the new public management (NPM) upon the UK higher 
education policy landscape.  As Rizvi and Lingard (2010, p.119) note, NPM has evolved a 
different mode of political control: a ‘steering at a distance’ via performance measures, a system 
which, in turn, functions from within a low-trust, surveillance culture. 
While higher education policy levers, and the culture they engender, represent the more punitive 
side of neoliberal practices, dominant public discourses around higher education participation in 
the UK are a good example of Phelan’s (2007) euphemized neoliberalism. Thus, where the 
transparent neoliberalism of Hayekian ideology is premised upon a set of antagonistically framed 
negative freedoms—freedom from state coercion etc—policy rhetoric tends to accentuate the 
promise of positive freedoms. At the level of the individual, the discourse of the learning = 
earning social contract offers social mobility and self-actualisation through remunerative and 
personally satisfying employment. And this points to the key difference between euphemized 
and transparent neoliberalism. While Hayek and fellow ideologues concentrated on winning over 
the opinions of elite civil society, they were far less concerned with mass consent. However, 
politicians must take more cognisance of this. Indeed, as Smith (2004, p.226) notes, in late 
modern capitalist societies, for a hegemonic project to be particularly effective, it needs to go 
beyond mere habituation and obtain active popular collusion whereby individuals perceive a 
trade-off for their participation in the social project. And, as Phelan (2007, p.35) observes, this 
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requires the presentation of a ‘non-ideological’ front by which the project takes on the form of a 
pragmatic, unarguable social good. The discourse of social mobility may be seen in this light. 
However, although such public faces of euphemized neoliberalism represent a clear discursive 
softening of the harsher edges of Hayekian ideology, they are no less neoliberal. Within the 
UK’s competitive free market settlement, social justice is constructed primarily as the provision 
of equal opportunities for individuals to succeed against the competition (Brown, 2013). In other 
words, a market framework premised upon a credential-driven race and underpinned by the 
rhetoric of meritocratic equality is seen to be the only real way to address wider inequalities of 
distributive justice. The effect of this discourse is to frame self-investment in education primarily 
in moral terms: the responsible citizen will invest to secure their own future and avoid being a 
burden upon the state (Rose, 1992). The prevalence of this discourse within policy circles, and 
the wider public acceptance of the related discourse of meritocracy, then provides a key 
normative justification for inequalities in income distribution and, importantly, an argument 
against redistributive measures (Littler, 2016; Sayer, 2009; Souto-Otero, 2010).  There are, 
though, fundamental flaws with the learning = earning contract, with implications for the lived 
labour market realities of working-class graduates as I discuss. 
 
Keeping the discursive promise:  ameliorative social justice 
Hayek’s unsentimental view of the market order’s indifference to inequalities appears to be 
reflected in current trends within the graduate labour market. The extent to which the UK 
economy has adequate demand for the supply of graduates that an expanded sector is producing 
is a key point of debate. Nevertheless, a growing body of literature points to there being a 
relative over-supply (Behle et al., 2016; Brown, Lauder & Ashton, 2011; CIPD, 2015; Tholen, 
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2014). The reasons behind this are complex but one persuasive argument lies in Brown’s (2013) 
thesis that the graduate labour market has made a shift from being a meritocracy to a 
‘performocracy’. By this, Brown (2013) means that credentials (positional goods in an old-style 
bureaucratic meritocracy) have less value due to higher education expansion while employers 
now place a premium on whether the applicant has the cultural and social skills to deliver a 
‘winning performance’: a performocracy. In practice, this means a cut-throat competition for 
jobs in which candidates deploy all their cultural and social resources to gain an advantage and in 
which working-class applicants will find it increasingly difficult to ‘hide’ behind the mask of 
technical expertise (Brown, 2013, p. 688). 
 
The extent to which these changes have become characteristic of the graduate labour market is 
contested (see Elias and Purcell, 2013). However, there is evidence that working-class graduates 
are generally coming off worse in this competition, with data indicating that graduates from 
lower socio-economic backgrounds are less likely to find graduate-level employment and 
typically earn substantially less than their more advantaged peers (Britton, Dearden, Shephard & 
Vignoles, 2016; HEFCE, 2015). For Brown (2013, p.682) neoliberalism’s promise of social 
mobility through widened access to higher education is, therefore, a ‘fallacy of fairness’. It 
cannot deliver on its promise because of the inherent contradictions within the methodological 
individualism of neoliberal economic theory: while it may be perfectly rational for one 
individual to try to get ahead in the jobs race, it is self-defeating if all try it where there is a finite 
supply of 'good' jobs. These class-related inequalities of graduate employment are important 
because they challenge the legitimacy of the social mobility promise of higher education and the 
rhetorical aspirations of politicians (Social Mobility Commission (2017a p.1). While most of the 
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governmental focus to redress graduate employment inequalities has been upon the roles of 
higher education institutions, there has also been a growing interest, which has persisted across 
changes of ruling political parties, in the actions of employers themselves. Here, the particular 
object of scrutiny has been upon the recruitment practices of elite professional employers, 
particularly large corporations in the areas of the media, law and high-end finance, and how open 
and fair they are to graduates from lower socio-economic backgrounds (APPG, 2017; Cabinet 
Office, 2009, 2011).  
 
In recent years a number of bodies with a remit to scrutinise and feed into policy making, and 
also some influential policy-research and lobbying ‘Think Tanks’, have produced a range of 
publications which address themselves, to varying degrees, to the issues I have outlined above. I 
shall discuss some of the most prominent and influential within this article. The key policy 
bodies which refer to these concerns are The Social Mobility Commission (2016, 2017b), an 
advisory non-departmental public body tasked with monitoring progress towards improving 
social mobility; The House of Commons All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Social 
Mobility (APPG, 2017); The Social Mobility Advisory Group, established in 2015, to the UK’s 
representative body for universities, Universities UK (UUK, 2016); The government-
commissioned Taylor Review on working practices (Taylor, Marsh, Nicol & Broadbent, 2017). 
Additionally, the centre-left leaning Institute for Public Policy Research, an influential Think 
Tank, has examined these issues (Roberts, 2017) as has The Sutton Trust, an educational 
research charity aimed at improving social mobility through education (Sutton Trust, 2014). 
Again, key employment areas which many of these bodies focus upon by way of illustrative 
examples are elite-entry corporate law, finance and media. 
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These bodies have issued a range of recommendations for ameliorative interventions to improve 
class-related inequalities in graduate employment outcomes. A key recommendation, which has 
also garnered much media interest, has been the call to ban unpaid internships of more than four 
weeks’ duration (APPG, 2017; Roberts, 2017; Taylor et al. 2017; Social Mobility Commission 
(2016; 2017b; Sutton Trust, 2014). This practice, which has become a widespread form of entry 
into eventual paid employment within elite professions (APPG, 2017) has been shown to 
strongly disadvantage working-class graduates who may lack the social contacts to secure the 
work experience and the economic capital to sustain unpaid work (Social Mobility Commission 
(2016; Bathmaker et al., 2016). This issue is clearly making some inroads into potential policy 
development since, at the time of writing, the Unpaid Work Experience Prohibition Bill, 
sponsored by Lord Holmes of Richmond, is due to undergo a second reading in the UK's second 
political chamber, the House of Lords. 
 
Another key theme to emerge is the recommendation that private and public sector graduate 
recruiters monitor and publish their recruitment data, making particular reference to socio-
economic status (APPG, 2017; UUK, 2016). Advances have been made in this direction with the 
establishment of The Social Mobility Employer Index. This is a joint initiative between the 
Social Mobility Foundation, a nation-wide voluntary organisation dedicated to improving social 
mobility prospects for young people from lower socio-economic backgrounds, and the Social 
Mobility Commission in partnership with the City of London Corporation. Large graduate-
recruiting employers who wish to participate agree to record and publish data regarding their 
success across seven key social mobility indices. The results will then serve as a form of ‘league 
table’ of employers. The APPG (2017, p.5) report recommended that this measure should be 
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seen as ‘akin to diversity tracking and other protected characteristics’. This reference to legal 
protection makes this area, along with the moves to abolish unpaid internships, one of the most 
strongly worded, dirigiste recommendations. These recommendations echo comments by 
Bathmaker et al. (2016, p.149) who, in their study of higher education and social class mobility, 
noted critically that social class was not a protected category under the UK’s 2010 Equality Act 
unlike gender, ethnicity and sexuality, leading to the free spread of what they termed ‘classism’. 
A third salient theme revolved around the development of leadership skills through mentoring 
programmes. For example, the APPG (2017, p.13) report notes that leadership qualities are 
closely linked in employers’ minds with confidence and that, in turn, confidence is associated 
with the display of a certain kind of social extraversion, assertiveness and sociability. The report 
notes the links between these qualities and graduates’ social class origins (APPG, 2017, p.13). In 
its observations, the APPG report has alighted upon an aspect of graduate employability that has 
long been a focus of critical concern at policy (Cabinet Office, 2009) and within academic 
research studies (Ashley, Duberley, Sommerlad & Scholarios, 2015; Brown & Hesketh, 2004). 
The APPG report notes that the effect of such employer perceptions is to perpetuate networking 
and clustering effects within organisations that work to the disadvantage of candidates from 
lower socio-economic backgrounds. In response to such concerns, recent governments have 
supported the publication of a Common Best Practice Code for High-Quality Internships to 
encourage employers to provide high-quality internships which include mentoring development. 
The Social Mobility Foundation also runs its own Aspiring Professionals Programme (APP) 
which includes online employer mentoring of young people. Both initiatives are, though, 
voluntary for employers. 
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In the light of Hayek’s theoretical frame, what are we to make of this 'euphemized discourse', 
that is, (a) higher education’s discursive promise of social mobility; and (b) policy 
recommendations to address graduate employment inequalities?  
 
 
 
Hayek, the Knowledge Economy and Social Mobility 
In the introduction, I indicated that Hayek’s ideas on the spontaneous order, knowledge, and 
morality within a market order were sophisticated and, ironically, provided the resources for 
critique of the practices of actually existing euphemized neoliberalism. Thus, a reading of 
Hayek’s writings on the role of knowledge within a market economy reveals views that are 
clearly at odds with the human capital tenets of neoliberalism as political and economic practices 
in the UK. These views on the limits of knowledge need to be seen, in turn, in the context of his 
elaboration of ‘spontaneous’ orders—a second area where Hayek offers a tool for critique 
euphemized neoliberalism. For Hayek, the market economy—which Hayek (1982) termed a 
catallaxy—is a spontaneous order where individuals, or even groups of individuals, can at best 
have imperfect knowledge of the whole order. Due to the limitations of individuals’ knowledge, 
new knowledge is created through the interactions of individuals whose own personal ends 
(although perhaps different) align sufficiently for knowledge to be created and passed on (Hayek, 
1945, p.526). As Lin (2007, p.561) notes in writing more generally of the Austrian School of 
which Hayek was a leading exponent, this is a view of knowledge as ‘market-oriented’ for 
growth whereby knowledge is embodied and relational. This perspective distinguishes itself 
somewhat from the credentialist ‘knowledge-driven growth’ (Lin, 2007, p.561) which forms the 
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premises of current human capital assumptions surrounding higher education and the labour 
markets in the UK. 
 
If there is some conceptual distance between Hayek’s view of the relationship between 
knowledge and market relations, and current UK higher education and labour market policies, 
this plays out quite clearly in his comments on higher education. Despite his methodological and 
political individualism, Hayek (1960, p.382) insisted that public subsidy of higher education 
should be based upon the benefits it brings to the wider community rather than upon any 
advantages that it may offer to the individual. The discourse of personal betterment and the 
promise of social mobility around which higher education participation is promoted to young 
people and their parents in the UK would thus have found no favour with Hayek. More broadly, 
Hayek was sceptical of the value of higher-level credentials as a means of assorting talent, 
considering them to hold the potential for the kind of centralised social control he abhorred 
(Hayek, 1960, p.387). 
For Hayek, then, it is market relations which create knowledge and which accord a value to that 
knowledge. However, Hayek was certainly alive to the reality that inequalities within a market 
order were inevitable. This leads me to the third area where Hayek’s ideas contribute to a 
critique of euphemized neoliberalism: his views on market morality. For Hayek (1960, p.83) 
inequalities were unavoidable because the market rewarded according to ‘value’—the monetary 
value of an individual’s services—and not by ‘merit’—the ‘attributes of conduct’ and ‘moral 
character’ of an individual. Consequently, by no means all those who were deserving (in the 
sense of the amount of effort placed into their actions or the moral probity of their intentions) 
actually get their just desserts. Hayek (1982) ultimately drew the wrong conclusions from this, 
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seeing it as fundamental to the essential vigour of the market. Nevertheless, his perception of the 
morally neutral functioning of the market order also led him to openly question the ethics of a 
discourse that leads young people to believe that effort will produce commensurate reward:  
It is therefore a real dilemma to what extent we ought to encourage in 
the young the belief that when they really try they will succeed, or 
should rather emphasize that inevitably some unworthy will succeed 
and some worthy fail-whether we ought to allow the views of those 
groups to prevail with whom the over-confidence in the appropriate 
reward of the able and industrious is strong and who in consequence 
will do much that benefits the rest, and whether without such partly 
erroneous beliefs the large numbers will tolerate actual differences in 
rewards which will be based only partly on achievement and partly on 
mere chance. (Hayek, 1982, p.74)  
 
It is, perhaps, ironic then that one of the principal intellectual architects of the free market should 
be somewhat at odds with one of the key legitimating discourses of euphemized neoliberalism in 
Britain: the learning = earning contract by which social justice is understood as the promise of 
social mobility through the acquisition of higher-level skills and credentials. Moreover, if Hayek 
would have been sceptical of this discourse, it is clear that he would also have been deeply 
averse to the interventions proposed by the policy bodies that I have outlined. For anybody 
towards the left, these conclusions are deeply regressive but there is no doubt that they derive 
from his clear-eyed view of the limits of social justice within a market order. Hayek was very 
much aware that (though he did not actually use such terms) individuals had widely differing 
levels of cultural, social and economic capital and that these were accrued through familial 
socialisation. However, Hayek’s (1960) insistence upon the impersonal nature of the forces 
which mould our fortunes, and his distinction between value and merit, meant that he was quite 
comfortable with the idea of inherited privileges within a competitive market economy. Thus, to 
be born into a family with material and cultural advantages could be simply reduced to ‘luck’, 
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which no state (a term he disliked intensely) could or should try to do anything about. Hayek 
(1960, p.79), in fact, went further than this in arguing that the market order needed the ‘socially 
valuable qualities’ that only generational social reproduction could bring into being, and thus: 
This means simply that there are parts of the cultural heritage of a 
society that are more effectively transmitted through the family. 
Granted this, it would be unreasonable to deny that a society is likely 
to get a better elite if ascent is not limited to one generation, if 
individuals are not deliberately made to start from the same level 
(Hayek, 1960, p.79) 
 
Once we accept this, we must also accept that all efforts at ameliorative measures in relation to 
social inequalities will fail because the inheritance of advantage, whether cultural or material, is 
an inevitable fact of life within a competitive market order. Moreover, attempts to redress 
inequalities through the application of reward on the basis of merit rather than of value stumble 
upon the intractable problem that merit is inherently subjective and therefore difficult to assess 
whereas value may be quantified clearly in market terms (Hayek 1960, p.79). It would seem 
clear, therefore, that under a reading of Hayek some of the recommendations outlined by these 
publications, such as the monitoring and publication of recruitment data would be, at best, an 
irrelevant meddling in the free functioning of the wealth-creating game. Other recommendations 
though, such as the call to extend the use of mentoring to address concerns about the role of a 
certain classed sense of social confidence and ‘cultural fit’ in elite employer recruitment 
practices (Brown & Hesketh, 2004) and the moves to ban unpaid internships would be more 
directly intolerable to Hayek’s views on inherited cultural and material advantages within the 
framework of a morally neutral market order.  
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Hybrid Neoliberalism and Organic Intellectuals Revisited 
From within a wider Gramscian analysis, this article has drawn upon Phelan’s (2007) heuristic 
distinction between ‘transparent neoliberalism’ and ‘euphemized neoliberalism’ to tease out 
some of the operative dissonances between neoliberalism as ideology and as discourse. The 
particular contribution of this article has been to apply this model to a close comparative reading 
of the work of Hayek and of the dominant discourses within the UK regarding human capital and 
related policy concerns in relation to class-based inequalities in graduate employment outcomes. 
I have argued that a reading of Hayekian ideological views points to the fundamental 
incompatibility between a market society and social justice, a perspective which, ironically, he 
shares with radical left critics. Hayek accepted and, indeed, celebrated this disjunction. However, 
the candour of his transparent neoliberalism and sophistication of his ideas provide an unwitting 
critique of the euphemized neoliberalism of higher education’s social mobility promise. Phelan’s 
(2007) model has, therefore, been of value to this study in highlighting the relational differences 
between these two facets of neoliberalism. Ultimately, though, as I have argued, these are two 
sides of the neoliberal coin and reflect its ever-evolving ‘hybrid’ nature (Peck, 2013). The 
discourses of human capital and social mobility represent a more publicly placatory version of 
the sharp edges of Hayek’s ideology but both are thoroughly neoliberal in that they do its 
necessary work; both therefore need to be incorporated into a critical understanding of 
neoliberalism as I have done in relation to the problematic of graduate employment outcomes.  
The discourses of euphemized neoliberalism are directed at winning consent (in its varying 
degrees) to a social market order: a key ingredient of the success of modern hegemonies. As 
Phelan (2007, p.35) cautions, however, behind such discourses we see the persistence of an 
essentially antagonistic politics strategically articulated in a de-politicised moral register. 
22 
 
Certainly, this characterises the work of human capital and social mobility discourses and their 
capacity to at least partially de-legitimise alternative, more redistributive, forms of political 
economy in the UK. Consequently, as Phelan (2007, p.35) goes on to note, it would be wrong to 
automatically assume that transparent neoliberalism is necessarily the more ideological of the 
two relational identities since the manufacturing of a 'post-ideological' political identity is itself 
the cleverest possible ideological manoeuvre. Having acknowledged this, though, what is the 
function of transparent neoliberalism and of its contributory organic intellectuals, such as 
Hayek? I have argued that they provided intellectual coherence and identity and, in the activities 
of the MPN, acted as an important recruiting sergeant to the cause. However, the concept of the 
organic intellectual was elaborated by Gramsci in an age quite different from our own, and I 
conclude this article by addressing some criticisms that contemporary intellectuals can no longer 
perform the function ascribed to them by Gramsci. 
In an important commentary on the shifting social position of intellectuals, Bauman (1988, 
p.225) argues that we have moved from a situation of Gramscian organic intellectuals of other 
classes to one wherein intellectuals constitute a class for themselves, a change which has made 
them more overt and self-aware but less socially relevant. Among other factors, he relates this to 
the growth of 'market dependency', a tendency with far-reaching implications for the role of 
intellectuals and the legitimating authority they have traditionally lent the state and its dominant 
classes. Under conditions of market dependency—the intrusion of the market into individual 
subjectivities and modes of being whereby people can only think and act in terms of commodity 
relations—the dominant classes of capitalism no longer have need of the traditional authorising 
role of intellectuals; late modern capitalism rests not on legitimation but on consumerist 
seduction of its subjects, which is effected through technocratic expertise rather than intellectual 
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authority (Bauman, 1988, p.222). This loss of role and authority of what are, in Gramscian terms, 
traditional intellectuals, also has implications for the work of organic intellectuals. The fact that 
we now enjoy increased freedom of intellectual debate is, quite simply, because the capitalist 
elite can afford to indulge it since it does not challenge their hegemonic grip (Bauman, 1988, 
p.224). The counter-hegemonic function of organic intellectuals therefore becomes nullified. 
Bauman’s (1988) critique certainly captures some of the key social and epistemic shifts that have 
occurred since Gramsci wrote on organic intellectuals, and it thus offers a caution against any 
simplistic application of the concept. Nevertheless, there is a key problem with Bauman’s (1988) 
analysis. It is curious that in discussing market dependency, Bauman (1988) appears to take an 
ahistorical view of the seemingly totalising effects of (though he does not actually use the term) 
neoliberalism. And here lies the continuing value of a Gramscian analysis. The concept of 
organic intellectuals, like all analytical tools, needs to be seen in relation to the wider schema of 
which it is a part. As I have demonstrated within this article, organic intellectuals are a key 
component of conjunctural analysis: a form of investigation which views change in its wider 
historical context and understands it as contradictory, contingent and open to political agency. 
And this theoretical tool-box equips us to grasp what Bauman’s (1988) totalising characterisation 
of neoliberalism obscures, that it is a hybrid entity existing and competing with other 
historically-rooted cultural and social trends and which is never total. There is always the 
potential, therefore, for genuine counter-hegemonic intellectual contestation of this political-
economic order—and that is the role of organic intellectuals. 
 
References 
24 
 
All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Mobility [APPG]. (2017). The class ceiling: Increasing 
access to the leading professions. Retrieved from http://www.suttontrust.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/APPG-on-Social-Mobility_Report_FINAL.pdf 
 
Ashley, L., Duberley, J., Sommerlad, H., & Scholarios, D. (2015). A qualitative evaluation of 
non-educational barriers to the elite professions. London: Social Mobility and Child Poverty 
Commission. 
 
Bathmaker, A., Ingram., N., Abrahams, J., Hoare, A., Waller, R., & Bradley, H. (2016). Higher 
Education, Social Class and Social Mobility: The Degree Generation. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Bathmaker, A., Ingram, N., & Waller, R. (2013). Higher education, social class and the 
mobilisation of capitals: recognising and playing the game. British Journal of Sociology of 
Education, 34(5-6), 723-743. 
 
Bauman, Z. (1988). Is There a Postmodern Sociology?, Theory, Culture & Society, 5, 217-237. 
 
Behle, H., Atfield, G., Elias, P., Gambin, L., Green A., Hogarth, T. … Warhurst, C. (2016). 
Reassessing the employment outcomes of higher education. In J.M Case & J. Huisman (Eds.), 
Researching Higher Education: International Perspectives on Theory, Policy and Practice 
(pp.114-131). London: Routledge/SRHE. 
 
Britton, J., Dearden, L., Shephard, N., & Vignoles, A. (2016). How English domiciled graduate 
earnings vary with gender, institution attended, subject and socio-economic background. IFS 
Working Paper W16/06. London: Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
 
Brown, P. (2013). Education, opportunity and the prospects for social mobility, British Journal 
of Sociology of Education, 34(5-6), 678-700. 
 
Brown, P., Lauder, H., & Ashton, D. (2011) The Global Auction. Oxford: New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Brown, P., & Hesketh, A. (2004). The Mismanagement of Talent: Employability and Jobs in the 
Knowledge Economy. Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Burke, C. (2016). Culture, Capitals and Graduate Futures. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. 
 
Cabinet Office. (2011). Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers: A Strategy for Social Mobility. London: 
HMSO. 
 
Cabinet Office. (2009). Unleashing Aspiration: The Final Report of the Panel on Fair Access to 
the Professions. London: HMSO. 
 
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development [CIPD]. (2015). Over-qualification and skills 
mismatch in the graduate labour market.  London: CIPD. 
 
25 
 
Clarke, J. (2007). Subordinating the Social?, Cultural Studies, 21, 6, 974-987. 
 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills [DBIS]. (2016). Fulfilling Our Potential: 
Teaching Excellence, Social Mobility and Student Choice. London: HMSO. 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills [DBIS]. (2011). Higher Education: Students at 
the Heart of the System. London: HMSO. 
 
Desai, R. (1994). Second-Hand Dealers in Ideas: Think-Tanks and Thatcherite Hegemony, New 
Left Review, 1/203, 27-64. 
 
Elias, P., & Purcell, K. (2013). Classifying graduate occupations for the knowledge society 
HECSU/IER. 
 
Feser, E. (1997). Hayek on social justice: Reply to Lukes and Johnston, Critical Review, 11(4), 
581-606. 
 
Gamble, A. (1996). Hayek and the Left, Political Quarterly, 67 (1), 46-53. 
 
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (Q. Hoare & G. 
Nowell-Smith, Eds.), London: Lawrence  and Wishart. 
Gramsci, A. (1988) A Gramsci Reader D. Forgacs (Ed.), London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
Griffiths, S. (2014). Engaging Enemies: Hayek and the Left London: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Hall, S. (2016). The Neoliberal Revolution. In J.Gilbert (Ed.), Neoliberal Culture. (pp.13-31). 
London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
 
Hayek, F.A. (1982). Law, Legislation and Liberty: A new statement of the liberal principles of 
justice and political economy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. 
 
Hayek, F.A. (1960/2006). The Constitution of Liberty. London, New York: Routledge Classics. 
 
Hayek, F.A. (1945) The Use of Knowledge in Society. The American Economic Review, 35(4), 
519-530. 
 
Hayek, F.A. (1944/2001). The Road to Serfdom. London, New York: Routledge Classics. 
 
Higher Education Funding Council for England [HEFCE]. (2015). Differences in employment 
outcomes: equality and diversity characteristics. 
 
Keep, E., & Mayhew K. (2014). Inequality – ‘wicked problems’, labour market outcomes and 
the search for silver bullets. Oxford Review of Education, 40 (6), 764-781. 
 
Lauder, H., Young, M., Daniels, H., Balarin, M., & Lowe, J. (2012). Introduction. In H. Lauder, 
M. Young, H. Daniels, M. Balarin & J. Lowe (Eds.),  Educating for the knowledge economy? 
Critical perspectives (pp.1-24). Abingdon, UK: Routledge Falmer. 
26 
 
 
Lin, B.C. (2007). A New Vision of the Knowledge Economy. Journal of Economic Surveys 21 
(3), 553-584. 
 
Lister, A. 2013. The “Mirage” of Social Justice: Hayek Against (and For) Rawls. Critical 
Review, 25(3-4), 409-444. 
Littler, J. (2016). Meritocracy as Plutocracy: The Marketising of ‘Equality’ Under 
Neoliberalism. In J.Gilbert (Ed.), Neoliberal Culture, (pp.73-100). London: Lawrence and 
Wishart. 
Lukes, S. (1997). Social justice: The Hayekian challenge. Critical Review, 11(1), 65-80. 
Mirowski, P. (2013). Never let a serious crisis go to waste. London: Verso. 
Peck, J. (2013). Explaining (with) Neoliberalism. Territory, Politics, Governance, 1(2), 132-157. 
 
Phelan, S. (2007). The discourses of neoliberal hegemony: the case of the Irish Republic, Critical 
Discourse Studies, 4(1), 29-48. 
Reay, D. (2008). Tony Blair, the promotion of the 'active' educational citizen, and middle-class 
hegemony, Oxford Review of Education, 34(6), 639--650. 
Rivzi, F., & Lingard, B. (2010). Globalizing Education Policy. London: Routledge. 
 
Roberts, C. (2017). The Inbetweeners: The New Role of Internships in the Graduate Labour 
Market, London: Institute for Public Policy Research [IPPR]. 
 
Rose, N. (1992). Governing the enterprising self. In P. Hellas & P. Morris (Eds.), The Values of 
the Enterprise Culture. (pp.141-164). London: Routledge. 
 
Sayer, A. (2009). Contributive Justice and Meaningful Work, Res Publica, 15, 1-16. 
 
Smith, G. (2004). Hegemony. In D. Nugent and J. Vincent (Eds.) A Companion to the 
Anthropology of Politics, (pp.216-230). Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Social Mobility Commission. (2017a). Time For Change: An Assessment of Government Policies 
on Social Mobility 1997-2017. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-mobility-policies-between-1997-and-2017-
time-for-change 
 
Social Mobility Commission. (2017b). State of the Nation 2017: Social Mobility in Great 
Britain. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/662744/State_of_t
he_Nation_2017_-_Social_Mobility_in_Great_Britain.pdf 
 
Social Mobility Commission. (2016). State of the Nation 2016: Social Mobility in Great Britain. 
Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/state-of-the-nation-2016 
27 
 
 
Souto‐Otero, M. (2010). Education, meritocracy and redistribution, Journal of Education Policy, 
25, 3, 397-413. 
 
Sutton Trust. (2014). Internship or Indenture. Retrieved from www.suttontrust.com/research-
paper/internships. 
 
Taylor, M., Marsh, G., Nicol, D., & Broadbent, P. (2017). Good Work: The Taylor Review of 
Modern Working Practices. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/good-
work-the-taylor-review-of-modern-working-practices 
 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2013). The double-crisis of the welfare state and what we can do about it. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Tholen, G. (2014). The Changing Nature of the Graduate Labour Market. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Universities UK [UUK]. (2016). Working in partnership: enabling social mobility: The final 
report of the Social Mobility Advisory Group. London: UUK. 
 
 
 
 
